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I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject-matter of this article was originally conceived of as consumer
protection issues in banking sectors of developing countries. In first approaching
this topic area, the author had on his "industrialized country hat" which
automatically assumes that there preexists a broad consumer base from which to
work. But in stepping back and putting on his "developing country legal reform
hat," the author came to realize that approximately two-thirds of the world's people
are effectively excluded from the mainstream banking and financial sectors of their
respective countries, thus denying them an ability to meet basic financial needs and
any realistic prospects of wealth creation, and foregoing the mainstream financial
systems in these countries from more fully maturing in the sense of contributing
more fully to the developmental needs of these countries. As such, what consumer
base would exist in a developing country would only encapsulate the top of the
socioeconomic pyramid of that country. Thus, the critical, foundational issue that
needs to be addressed respecting consumer banking issues in developing countries is
that of "inclusion."
The primary proposition being set forth in this article is that, notwithstanding
the plethora of global banking sector reform over the past two decades, the equitable
and accessible provision of banking services has never been a core component of
modern banking sector legal reform and assessment in the developing world. As
such, before one can sensibly talk about a viable banking and financial sector
framework in a developing country, a reasonably broad user (i.e., consumer) base
needs to be developed. In effect, the banking and financial system of the developing
country needs to become accessible to the "excluded": serving just the top of the
economic pyramid is shortsighted and, in the long term, counterproductive. Once a
broad and equitable base is established, a developing country can sensibly and
effectively address the formulation of an adequate consumer protection framework
so that new entrants and those still remaining outside the mainstream financial
sector are not discriminated against or treated unfairly. While these conclusions
seem to be obvious, it is only most recently that the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank, have begun to more systematically
address these fundamental deficiencies in developmental legal reform agendas
respecting the banking/financial sector.'
1. Certain abbreviations and acronyms used in this article include: anti-money laundering (AML);
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; Bank for International Settlements (BIS); World Bank's
Country Assistance Strategies (CAS); Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP); counterterrorism
financing; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); European Union; Financial
Action Task Force; Financial Sector Assessment (FSA); Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP);
Financial Stability Forum (FSF); Group of 7 (G7); Group of Eight (G8); Group of Ten (G10); Group of
Twenty (G20); General Agreement on Trade in Services; International Association of Deposit Insurers
(IADI); International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); International Accounting Standards
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From this author's perspective of over two decades of study and practical
involvement with financial sector reform in developing, transitioning, and emerging
economies, he is of the considered view that: (i) the modern banking and financial
sector law reform policies and infrastructures process is of relatively recent vintage;
(ii) this reform process has been largely crisis-oriented and reactive by necessity and
has become driven largely by industrialized countries' systemic objectives of
preventing financial crises and related contagion, fostering global financial stability,
and more recently, maintaining financial sector integrity; and (iii) this "first
generation" of reform has never had the luxury of being clearly thought through in
terms of how developmental factors such as access, equality, and user protection can
be incorporated into the overall financial sector legal reform processes in an
integrated and coherent manner that promotes the United Nations' Millennium
Development Goal of alleviating poverty.2
It is the general view of this author that the future banking and financial sector
legal policy and infrastructure reform process of the IFIs and others in the economic
development arena should systematically and thoughtfully undertake this reform
process within, or alongside of, a complementary framework and context of
meaningful and relevant economic-social development policy objectives, including
the object of making the financial base broader and more inclusionary. Quite
simply, such reform should be coordinated on the policy, implementation, and
assessment levels, with the broader economic development objectives and policies of
the particular developing country.
Part II of this article will attempt to evaluate banking sector legal reform efforts
as to developing countries over the past decade and a half. Part III will consider
recent selective efforts of the World Bank in addressing the access and equity issues
respecting the banking sector. Part IV will consider two current developments of
relevance: the rise of microfinancing and the efforts to engage private industry's
cooperative efforts. Part V will provide some concluding reflections on the
importance of the legal infrastructural, institutional, and policy reorientation
dimensions of such reform efforts.

Committee (IASC); International Federation of Accountants; International Financial Arrangement (IFA);
International Finance Corporation (IFC); International Financial Institution (IFI); International Monetary
Fund (IMF); International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO); Joint Forum (JF); Legal
Vice Presidency of the World Bank (LVP); Microfinance Institutions (MFI); New International Financial
Architecture (NIFA): Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Regional
Financial Institution (RFI); Reports on the Observance on Standards and Codes (ROSC); Small and
Medium-sized Enterprises (SME); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
International Development Association (WB, or World Bank); and World Trade Organization (WTO).
2. See
generally
U.N.
Millennium
Development
Goals,
available
at
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org.
3. As will be pointed out throughout this paper, modern "financial sector development" is not
necessarily consistent with or supportive of what should be a developing country's broader "economic
development" planning and policies. But cf., Thorsten Beck, Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Maria Soledad
Martinez Peria, Reaching Out: Access To and Use of Banking Services Across Countries (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 3754, Oct. 2005).
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EVALUATING BANKING SECTOR LEGAL REFORM FOR

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS
Banking sector legal reform as a mandate for domestic and international
financial authorities of developing countries is clearly of recent vintage, and is
largely the reactive byproduct of the major industrialized countries' concern over
financial crises and the quest for global financial stability during the 1990s,' the new
transitioning economies arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
enlargement of the European Union, and the ongoing onslaught of economic
5
globalization -each of which are interconnected in various ways. More specifically,
this reform over the past decade has been largely driven by the G7/G8 grouping of
industrialized countries.
A.

Modern Banking Sector Legal Reform as G7/G8 Mandated and as Part of NIFA

In terms of becoming a major concern of the IFIs, banking sector, and other
financial sectors, legal reform as to developing countries began gaining credence and
taking shape as part of the G7/G86 invention of the notion of a New International
Financial Architecture. NIFA in fact is a misnomer of sorts and in some sense a
public relations ploy to dress over an ongoing quandary of what to do with an
international financial "non-system." 8 Yet, even if no true "architecture" had
existed to be replaced by NIFA, and though NIFA is itself probably not a true
architecture or system, a working base did come to exist through the NIFA, from
which a new architecture and a next generation of banking and financial sector legal
reform could be developed.

4. In fact, when one reviews the annual intergovernmental Communiques of the G7/G8 from 1975
through the mid-1990s, one notes, by conspicuous absence, that the financial sector infrastructure
(including its legal dimensions) is left unattended. Globally significant macroeconomic issues were the rule
of the day for the annual agendas.
5. It is true one can find specific anecdotal examples of financial law-related reforms during the 1960s
and 1970s, but these were largely isolated reforms designed to facilitate a certain development project. An
IFI-related example was in the early years of the EBRD, which views itself more as an International
Finance Corporation-type of commercially oriented development institution: in the 1990s any institutional
or legal reform in its mandate countries was specifically project-focused. It was only by the mid-1990s, that
the EBRD set up a law reform component of its General Counsel's Office, but the component tended to
look at more generic law reform issues, such as a model secured transaction law. See, e.g., EMERGING
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACrIONS (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds., 1998).
6. Inaugurated in 1975 by the then-heads of the French and German governments for the purpose of
creating a more meaningful forum for Heads of State Summits of the major industrialized countries, the
G8 (known as the G7 from 1976 until 1998, when Russia was fully admitted) has met annually to consider
the major global macroeconomic and political issues. See the major G8 Information Centre website
maintained by the University of Toronto, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca.
7. The first use of the specific term "New International Financial Architecture" is often attributed to
Mr. Michel Camdessus, former Managing Director of the IMF, who began regularly to use this term in
1998. E.g., Michel Camdessus, Toward a New FinancialArchitecture for a Globalized World, Address at
available
at
8, 1998),
(May
Affairs
of
International
Institute
the
Royal
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/O50898.htm); J. J. Norton, A 'New International Financial
Architecture'?:Reflections on the PossibleLaw-Based Dimensions, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
Norton eds., 2002).
ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE APPROACH 135-182 (J.B. Attanasio & J.J.
8. Norton, supra note 7, at 180-82.
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NIFA, as it has unfolded through the various G7/G8 annual summits over the
past decade, has endeavoured to coordinate and direct a wide grouping of different,
though related, international bodies that have their own mandates, jurisdictions, and
powers: (i) multilateral agencies (IMF, WB, BIS, OECD);9 (ii) policy formulation
groups (G7/G8, G10, G20);' and (iii) international regulatory and standard-setting
authorities and arrangements (IFAs) (Basel Committee, IAIS, IOSCO, IASC, JF,
FSF)." In addition, in various and increasing ways, NIFA has brought the private
financial industry sectors into the equation. 2 As such, NIFA might be viewed as an
evolving policy construct moving towards a new governance structure which reflects
a public-private partnership among governments, financial sector authorities,
international financial institutions, and private international financial institutions in
the search of a stable, viable global financial environment. However, the main focus
of this "public-private partnership" is, for the most part, on globalfinancial stability
issues and on deepening financial markets rather than on broadening such markets
in terms of greater financial inclusion or serving the socioeconomic development
needs of the majority of the population of developing countries. 3
At its 1994 Naples Summit, the G7 Heads of State made financial sector reform
issues a major agenda item for its 1995 Halifax Summit. 4 But it was really not until
the Birmingham (1998), Cologne (1999), and Okinawa (2000) Summits that the
NIFA began to be fleshed out. 15 The G7 Finance Minister Reports in Cologne (June
1999) and Okinawa (June 2000) specifically followed up, in some detail, on the
following NIFA components:
- Strengthened Macroeconomic Policy for Emerging Economies;
- Strengthened and Reformed IFIs;
- Accurate and Timely Informational Flows and Transparency;
- Strong Financial Regulation in Industrial Countries;
- Strong Financial Systems in Emerging Markets;
- Exchange Rate Policies;
- Sound Accounting Standards;
- Legal Infrastructure;

9. See, e.g., Andrew Sheng, The New International Financial Architecture: Is There a Workable
Solution?, in A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: A VIABLE APPROACH, supra note 7,

ch. 1.
10.

See

IMF,

A

Guide

to

Committees,

Groups,

and

Clubs

(2006),

available

at

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm..
11.

See generally GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION LAW

POLICY AND PRACTICE (2001); JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY

STANDARDS (1995).

12. Virtually all of the international bodies involved directly or indirectly included the financial
industry sectors (as they are direct subjects of such standards) in their devising, revising, and implementing
of international financial sector standards.
13. See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation:
IncreasingReliance on a Public-PrivatePartnership,37 INT'L L. 43 (2003).
14. See Group of Seven [G7], Naples Summit Communique (July 9, 1994), available at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1994naples/communique/introduction.html.
15. See generally Heads of State and Related Communiqubs from the Various Summits from 19752006, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit.
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- Corporate Governance;
- Anticorruption/Money Laundering;
- Technological Innovation/Adaptation; and
- Risk Management.' 6
An integral element of all this would be a significant law-based dimension
7
evolving around global principles and standards setting (codes) as to the following:
- Banking Regulation;
- Capital Markets Regulation;
- Insurance Supervision;
- Corporate Governance;
- Financial Conglomerates;
- Payment, Settlement and Custody Mechanisms;
- Pension Funds and Collective Investment Schemes; and
- Accounting and Auditing Standards.
Though the G7 singled out treatment of emerging economies as to financial
sector reforms, the bottom line appears to be that these economies needed to adopt
and implement the unfolding "international standards and best practices," with the
IFIs playing a major role (directly and indirectly) in the implementation,
transmission, and related technical assistance processes. Otherwise, the focus of the
G8 heads of state and finance ministers at Birmingham, Cologne, and Okinawa as to
developing countries was mainly on debt alleviation for the poorest of the
developing countries and on integration of the developing world into the "global
environment."'" The underlying assumption appears to be that sustained global
growth, increased trade, and investment liberalization will bring increased economic
growth for developing countries and that a strengthened international financial
system will foster such global growth. 9
From 2000 to the present, the G8 appears to have been consumed with a
proliferation of international political and security crises. As to financial sector
reform, the use of Financial Sector Assessment Programs and greater IFI
cooperation is encouraged, and there is increased concern as to financial crimes,
relief for the poorest countries
corruption, and fighting terrorism financing. 2° Debt
2
'
Summit.
Gleneagles
2005
the
with
traction
gained

16. See infra notes 20-22 and acccompanying text.
17. The FSF oversees these standards and codes and has compiled the series of key standards and
See FSF, Compendium of Standards, available at
codes into a working Compendium.
http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html.
18. See, e.g., G7 Finance Ministers, Cologne, Germany, June 18-20, 1999, Report of the Koln
Economic Summit,available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm06l999.htm.
19. Id.
8,
2000, Report
Fukuoka, Japan, July
Ministers,
Finance
e.g.,
G7
20. See,
to the Heads of State and Government: Strengthening the InternationalFinancialArchitecture, available at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm20000708-st.html.
Documents,
Gleneagles
Centre:
Information
G8
Uofr
generally
21. See
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/index.html.
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This author suggests that the thrust of the G7/G8 financial sector reform
mandates over the past decade can be seen as geared to the following policy
concerns:
- Financial Crisis Avoidance and Resolution;
- Financial Stability;
- Financial Services Liberalization; and
- Regional and Global Cooperation.
More recently, financial sector reform also has been driven by industrialized
country concern for financial sector integrity, which has come to embrace the
following:
- Anti-Money Laundering (drug dealing and other criminal activities);
- Combating Terrorism Financing;
- Anti-Corruption;
- Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions;
- Transparency and Accountability; and
- Greater Availability of Information and Enhanced Disclosure."
While one can reasonably and in good faith rationalize that these focal points
are directly related to the economic development processes of developing countries,
the truth is that these concerns have been engendered as a result of industrialized
country interests, and that in many of these instances the interconnection with
substantive development goals of poverty reduction is indirect and sometimes
tenuous at best.23
That said, the bottom line is that the role of the IFIs in the area of financial
sector reform over the past decade has been mandated largely by the G7/8 global
policy determinations and directives.
B.

NIFA and the Role of InternationalStandards:An IndustrializedCountry
Initiative

As alluded to above, the G7/G8 directed a number of international
organizations to develop and implement international prudential standards
("codes") in order to encourage and improve confidence in and viability of domestic
financial systems.
Such standards were aimed at promoting sound financial
institutions, minimizing systemic risk, and encouraging savings and investment
activity through increased confidence in financial markets, both domestically and

22. World Bank, World Bank and AML/CFT, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/ (last
visited Oct. 12, 2006).
23. For example, having "Basel-compliant" banking systems is a good goal for all countriesdeveloped and developing-but for a developing country it does not really get to the core issue of how the
banking and financial system should best be structured to serve optimum country-specific socioeconomic
development needs. Also, while of key concern to the U.S. and other highly industrialized countries'
efforts in their so-called "global war on terrorism," it is quite dubious that the amount of efforts
development banks now spend on the areas of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing
produces any real development benefits that would justify the cost and effort.
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internationally. It must be noted at the outset, however, that these international
principles and standards were to be just that: minimum internationally accepted
guidelines that leave latitude in their implementation.24
The G7 Finance Ministers were impressed with the prior work of the Basel
Committee and IOSCO on developing "international standards for prudential
supervision" of banks, securities firms, and markets, as well as payment and
settlement systems.
In particular, the Ministers approved joint Basel
Committee/IOSCO work on market risk and capital adequacy, as well as derivatives
and futures exchanges-sophisticated areas of concern for the industrialized
countries.
The Ministers also recognized the cooperation among the bank,
securities, and insurance supervisors through the Joint Forum and recommended
better vehicles for increased institutional cooperation. With hindsight, one can see
from this thread the subsequent increased importance and spread of international
standards and codes and the later formation of the international standards
coordinator, the Financial Stability Forum."
Quite clearly, the development of international banking standards by the Basel
Committee long predates the emergence of the NIFA. In fact, in 1974 the Ministers
of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the "Group of 10,,26 became concerned
with possible development of international bank supervisory standards in response
to the interrelated insolvencies of two small international banks (the German
Bankhaus Herstatt and the American Franklin National Bank) that had resulted
from excessive exchange rate risks and the lack of coordinated supervision by the
concerned regulatory authorities to address this problem. Therefore, in 1975, they
established what is now the Basel Committee.27 Regarding this incident, the
governors of the Central Bank were not concerned about any specific systemic crisis.
However, it dawned on them that there was no established mechanism for
coordinating cross-border supervision of banking institutions that faced increased
international risks in the new 1970s era of global floating exchange rates.
In
addition, the governor of the Bank of England was becoming concerned that capital
adequacy of banking institutions was turning into an issue of international import;
traditionally, bank regulators/supervisors were primarily concerned with institutional
liquidity. As such, the first tasks of the Basel Committee were to consider cross-

24. See G7 Finance Ministers, Lyon, France: June 27-29, 1996, Report to the Heads of State and
Government on InternationalMonetary Stability, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/19961yon/finance.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
25. See id.
26. The G10 Group came about in 1974 as a consequence of the establishment in 1962 of the General
Agreement to Borrow (GAB) pursuant to decision of the Executive Board of the International Monetary
Fund. The Group was informally established with the support of the IMF, OECD, the Bank for
International Settlement, by the finance ministers of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the primary purpose of
intergovernmental consulting regarding implementation of calls upon the lines of credit extended to the
IMF under the GAB-the scope of such consultation being broadened over the years. Subsequently,
Switzerland has become an active member of the Group, rendering the "G10" designation a misnomer.
The G10 Group operates through the respective finance ministers on the highest level, but also on specific
subject-matters through various ad hoc committees. See generally Group of Ten homepage, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_34115_36191264_1_1_1_1,00.html.
27. Reference to the founding mandate for the Basel Committee from the Governors of the Central
Banks of the GIO countries can be found in a Press Communiqu6 of the G10 Central Bank Governors of
Feb. 12, 1975, issued through the BIS.
28. See NORTON, supra note 7, ch. 4, sec. IIA.
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The objects of this focus were
border supervision and capital adequacy.
international banks of the industrialized countries comprising the membership of the
Basel Committee. 9
During the 1980s, the Basel Committee produced a revised framework,
"Concordat," for attempting to allocate international bank supervisory authority
among the host and home regulator/supervisor; a rather sketchy version had been
quietly put together in 1975.30 This framework was revised on several occasions
during the remainder of the 1980s and the 1990s, largely as a reaction to specific
bank failures exposing the framework's inadequacies." Also, during the mid-1990s,
it became apparent that the "international banking institution" was an incomplete
notion for supervision of the large industrialized banks as they tended to operate
more and more within the structure of banking and financial "conglomerates."
Thus, a supervisory framework for dealing with these conglomerates also was
developed.32 This, in turn,33 led to a consideration of the issue of the "lead regulator"
as to such conglomerates.
The most significant efforts of the Committee from the 1980s to present have
been on risk-based capital adequacy standards. After extended, and at times
contentious, internal deliberations, a risk-based "Capital Adequacy Accord" was
promulgated by the Committee in 1988. 31 While a non-binding, non-official
document, this Accord soon (through a complex, informal, and uncoordinated
transmission matrix) became the international benchmark for bank capital adequacy
within the developed and then-developing world.35 Prior to this Accord, the capital
approach taken by most bank regulators/supervisors was a basic initial capitalization
requirement and then an ongoing requirement of some form of fixed capital-based
ratio (e.g., capital to assets).36 At the time, the 1988 Accord was thought to be a most
complex approach, while today it is considered a basic, rudimentary framework
when compared to the Committee's current proposal, the Basel II Accord.37
In a sense, the 1988 Capital Accord opened Pandora's box as to the future
formulation of international bank standards. Once a risk-based approach became
the guiding measure, it became logical for the Basel Committee to delve into a range
of other risks, such as exchange rates, interest rates, and other market-based and
29. See W.P. Cooke in Basle Supervisors Committee (June 21, 1984) (providing discussion of role of
Committee in document for external distribution).
30. The first public appearance of the 1975 Concordat was as an Annex ("Supervision of Banks'
Foreign Establishments") to R.C. Williams and G.G. Johnson, International Capital Markets: Recent
Developments and Short-Term Prospects,29-32 (IMF Occasional Paper No. 7, 1981).
31.

See, e.g., DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF

LAW (forthcoming 2007).
32.

See George A. Walker, The Law of FinancialConglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INT'L LAW.

57, 57 (1996).
33.

See George A. Walker, Conglomerate Law and International Financial Market Supervision, 17

ANN. REV. BANKING L. 287,293 (1998).
34. Basel Committee, InternationalConvergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July
1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsclll.pdf.

35. See Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for
Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299,1342 (1989).
36.

See, e.g., JOSEPH JUDE NORTON & SHERRY CASTLE WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL, ch. 3

(1995).
37. See Basel Committee, supra note 34; But cf, Basel Committee, International Convergence of
CapitalMeasurement and CapitalStandards(June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
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operational risks. These activities resulted in a series of other detailed Committee
pronouncements. Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing on to today, the
Committee became concerned with money laundering38 and related counterterrorism
regulatory standards. 9 Then, in the late 1990s, the Committee began to address the
issues of institutional governance more formally as to banking institutions."
Under the NIFA context, international standards and codes have evolved,
increasing as to subject-matter and continuing to be refined on the basis of global
and industrial country experiences and expectations. In this sense, they represent
the model components for a country's "modern" financial system, and they may be
utilized for multiple purposes. For example, an individual country may use
international standards to reform its domestic financial system. These codes and
standards may also comprise a part of IMF and Bank "conditionality" programs.
Additionally, they might be employed by an IFI in fulfilling requests for technical
assistance packages.
Or, they might be used by the IMF in its ROSCmacroeconomic surveillance efforts, or, more flexibly, by the Bank to assess
domestic financial infrastructures for development projects. No matter what the
application, on-the-ground reform work over the past two decades has shown
repeatedly that the introduction of standards and codes is a top-down model, that
each country's situation is sui generis, and that these standards and codes have not
been designed as developmental access instruments.'

III. THE WORLD BANK'S NEW AGENDA ON FINANCIAL ACCESS AND
EQUITY ISSUES
Inherently, the IFIs/RFIs represent an enormous repository of accumulated
knowledge of policies, theories, issues, and practices concerning the Developing
World. They are in a real sense socioeconomic and legal development knowledge
banks. As such, they should be in the best position to help influence and guide the
much-needed connection between financial sector development and meaningful
economic development goals respecting their developing client countries. This is
often easier said than done for a variety of overriding practical reasons. For
example, these RFI/IFIs tend to be complex bureaucracies, with enormous internal
and external competition over their limited human and financial resources. These
institutional demands have expanded exponentially over the past several decades,
covering not simply traditional macroeconomic development concerns, but also a
broad range of microeconomic matters, macro- and micro-financial sector concerns,
human capital development issues (the encapsulating one of which is poverty
alleviation), societal dilemmas such as gender issues, global human migration, and
fundamental human rights concerns. As can been seen, financial sector issues are
only one of many pressing demands upon IFI/RFI resources.

38. See, e.g., Basel Committee, Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering (Dec. 1988) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Basel Committee, Initiatives by the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO to Combat Money
Laundering and
the
Financing of
Terrorism:
Update
(Jan.
2005),
available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/jointll.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Basel Committee, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations (1999),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.pdf;
see also Feb. 2006 revision, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf.
41. See generally NORTON, supra note 7.
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Coherent and forward-looking institutional priority-setting by the IFI/RFIs is
difficult, time-consuming, and often contentious. These various institutions may
have differing mandates and approaches to these mandates.
Historically,
collaboration among these institutions has been marginal at best. In addition, as
discussed above, the IFI/RFI general focus on financial sector reform and specific
focus on the legal-institutional aspect thereof is a relatively recent "add-on"
dimension of these institutions, mandated by the G7/G8 and arising in large part as a
reaction to financial crises, the need for global financial stability, and concerns over
money laundering and terrorist financing. In addressing these financial sector
demands, the IFIs/RFIs have largely looked to standards of industrialized countries,
engaging in large measure staff and consultants drawn from the industrialized world
(people, incidentally, having significant financial sector experience in their country,
but little, if any, development background and experience).
A bright light in this quagmire is that most recently the IFIs/RFIs, in particular
the World Bank, are beginning to focus in a more comprehensive way on the
"missing component" to viable banking and financial sector legal reform in
developing countries: the inclusion of the Developing World population. Through
this focus reorientation, it may be possible for these institutions to better set and
develop their own internal priorities in this area of reform. This will allow them to
be of greater assistance to their Developing Country members in developing and
coordinating meaningful policies, institutions, and legal infrastructure with a view to
building more relevant, accessible, and equitable financial sectors.
In this context, it is of significance that the World Bank dedicated its entire
World Development Report 2006 to the theme of "Equity and Development."42 This
Report, the work-product of the Bank's staff, considers equity in terms of "two basic
principles": equal opportunity and avoidance of income deprivation. 43 The report
highlights that legal and regulatory frameworks and equitable justice systems can do
much to level the playing field in the political, economic, and sociocultural domains,
but can also reinforce existing inequalities.'
In addition, in anticipation of this
report, the Bank's Legal Vice Presidency (LVP), then under Hon. Roberto Dafiino,
perceptively held an extended high-level forerunner conference in December 2005
on "Law, Equity and Development." The primary purpose of this event was to
explore ways the LVP and the Bank should best approach matters of legal and
justice reform, including how to move the LVP forward to the next generation of
financial sector legal reform." This event was followed up and expanded upon by
another major World Bank Conference in spring 2006 on a wide range of issues
concerning "access and equality" in economic and financial development. 6
For illustrative purposes, Part III highlights two other significant developments
at the World Bank with respect to financial sector access issues. First, the Bank
recently commissioned a series of reports concerning access to financial services in

42. World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (2005).
43. Id.
44.
Id.
45. This conference was held on Dec. 1-2, 2005 at the IFC in Washington, DC.
46. See World Bank (Financial Sector), Global Conference on Access to Finance: Building Inclusive
Financial
Systems
(Washington,
D.C.,
May
30-31.
2006).
available
at
http://web.worldbank.orgfWBSITE/EXTERNALIWBIWBIPROGRAMSIFSLP/0,,contentMDK:2061156
0-pagePK:64156158-piPK:64152884-theSitePK:461005,00.html.
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Latin America. Hopefully, these and other country reports from the Bank will
provide a good comparative data- and policy base for the Bank and its LVP to begin
to formulate a "next generation" approach to bank/financial sector legal reform
respecting developing countries. The second Bank development is the expanded
actual and potential role that the Bank, with the IMF, is beginning to make of its
FSAPs and related country Financial Sector Assessments for purposes of fostering
financial sector access and equity.
A.

The Country Studies

The thematic strand that unifies the four World Bank studies discussed below,
which previous studies have glossed over, is that the definition of financial access
must be broadened. The definition is now seen not only to include the ability for
small businesses or individuals to obtain loans, but also to hold checking and savings
accounts, utilize debit and credit cards, pay for services at a branch or ATM instead
of only at a downtown office, and gain access to investment opportunities. These
studies all examine the methods of savings and how cultural, environmental, and
socioeconomic factors come into play in creating poverty. Government policies,
such as excessive reserve requirements, play a large role in reinforcing cycles of
poverty. Further, the studies find that access to technology can play a large role in
alleviating cycles of poverty by allowing the poor easier access to services. These
four studies are the following:
Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles,47 which examines
the essential question of how cycles of poverty reinforce themselves and what
policies can be put into place to break those cycles;
Access to Financial Services in Brazil,48 which examines specific issues in Brazil
and highlights their implications to government policy;
Access to Financial Services in Colombia: The "Unbanked" in Bogota, 9 which
lie outside the formal economy and why inclusion is necessary to economic
development and progress in Columbia and
Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States, ° which compares the
differences between access to financial services for the poor in both countries.
1. Virtuous and Vicious Circles. Written in 2005, this study explores in depth
the search for pro-poor growth. It is well known that such growth can increase
income to the poor and alleviate poverty.
The reverse thesis has not been sufficiently explored and provides the thesis for
this study: that vicious circles exist where low growth results in high poverty and high
poverty, in turn, results in low growth." The more novel thesis of the report is that
47.

GUILLERMO E. PERRY ET AL., POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH: VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS

CIRCLES (2006).
48.

ANJALI KUMAR, ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES IN BRAZIL (2005).

49. Tova Maria Solo & Astrid Manroth, Access to FinancialServices in Colombia: The "Unbanked" in
Bogotd, (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3834, 2006), available at
http://web.worldbank.orgfWBSITE/EXTERNALIWBI/WBIPROGRAMS/FSLP/0,,contentMDK:2061 162
8-pagePK:64156158-piPK:64152884-theSitePK:461005,00.html.
50. John Caskey et al., The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 3835, 2006), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3835.html.
51. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 47, at 41.
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Latin America's persistent poverty may itself be impeding the achievement of higher
growth rates, implying that there are reinforcing vicious circles keeping the poor in
poverty and from contributing to national growth. 2
In light of the study's findings, the question of whether financial policies should
emphasize pro-growth or pro-poor can be answered simply: "Yes." Strategies that
do not focus on growth ignore the greatest means that governments and institutions
have at their disposal for improving human well-being. These same institutions and
governments must also take into account the constraints facing the impoverished to
enable the poor to fully participate in any growth, thereby contributing back to the
wave of growth. This study describes the process of redressing these constraints and
brings to light an under-examined dimension of policy analysis that might be called
pro-growth poverty reduction. 3
This study shows that in order to achieve the greatest reduction in poverty, the
relative emphasis on growth versus redistribution should vary depending on the
individual country's initial conditions." Poor countries with relative equality, such as
Bolivia, Haiti, and Honduras, "have little to distribute [and] need first and foremost
high and sustained growth, even at the expense of some increases in inequality."55
The paper compares this kind of growth to the growth recently experienced in
China."
In contrast, countries with relatively greater wealth and inequality,
including much of Latin America-particularly Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico- need both higher growth and significant redistribution to begin the process
of reducing poverty. 7
The poverty traps described in chapter six of this study apply to both national
and regional areas equally. 8 Regional traps must take into account that within
countries, labor does not move freely. This creates large wage gaps of up to fifty
percent from region to region. 9
This study shows that the disparity in income inequality between Latin America
and contemporary Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
countries is due in part to "differences in returns to factors of production-the result
of the unequal distribution of human and other capital in Latin America."6 ° Another
reason for this disparity is "the generally unprogressive nature of Latin America's
system of transfers."61 Countries in Latin America heavily fund both progressive and
regressive programs, which offset each other.62 The study's conclusion is that a
country's financial history is not its destiny. The decline in Latin America's income
position in the last fifty years, compared with the OECD member nations' sharp
reductions in inequality during the same period, demonstrates that choices of
policies and institutions can lead to major improvements along both dimensions.63
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
PERRY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4.
See generally id. at 103-26.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
PERRY ET AL., supra note 47, at 4.
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For example, increased access to education and infrastructure has encouraged
growth, inequality, and poverty reduction; other policies, such as trade opening, have
encouraged growth while increasing inequality and poverty in the short run. 4 These
short-term issues can be mitigated by better policy considerations6 so that, in the long
run, these pro-growth policies will lead to more financial equality. 1
2. Access to FinancialServices in Brazil. The objective of the present study is
to identify ways of expanding access while acknowledging the risks and costs
involved and providing measures to mitigate their impact. The largest financial
system in Latin America is Brazil; "beyond its sheer size, the overall depth of
financial intermediation in Brazil, at almost 140% of gross domestic product, is
greater than those of its large neighbors in the region such as Mexico and Argentina,
despite their higher average per capita income." 66 With numerous banks in decline
since the late 1990s, concern about financial exclusion has increased over the last
decade despite Brazil's size. An estimated sixty million, or approximately one-third,
of Brazil's population have bank accounts.67
Brazil's policies, which attempt to provide credit to the poor, have a high cost.
These costs have another unintended result: the government's large borrowing
needs have a negative impact on private credit. Large reserve requirements add to
implicit taxation. Some more conservative estimates suggest that concessions and
support could amount to several billion Reais. 68 Unfortunately, Brazil's policies
themselves may also be ineffective in reaching the poorest and those most in need of
financial access.
An example of the cost and failure of Brazil's policies is the National Program
to Strengthen Family Agriculture (PRONAF) which is estimated to cost R$1.1
billion.69 The top two percent of borrowers receive fifty-seven percent of loans in
agriculture, whereas the lowest seventy-five percent of borrowers receive only six
percent of credit.70 As illustrated by the analysis of rural finance programs, many
such programs fail to reach their intended targets, instead they are captured by a few
individuals, to the detriment of broad-based access.
There is a role for more proactive government policies toward access to
financial services. However, the success of these policies will be the greatest if they
are backed by fundamental changes in overall approach to access. This approach
must be delivered through broad-based financial sector reforms that limit constraints
on the price and quantity of credit. Finally, the role given to the relatively small
number of public institutions charged with delivering these policies must be reduced
in order to ensure fair access.
3. Access to Financial Services in Colombia: The "Unbanked" in Bogota.
Supported by the Colombian Bank Association, this study finds that access to
financial services is a determinant in a country's development and that access to
financial services translates into progress.7
The study quotes Ross Levine's
statement that "[n]o shortage of evidence exists to suggest that the level of financial
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
KUMAR, supra note 48, at xxviii.
Id. at xxi.
Id. at xxii.
Id. at 280.
Id.
See generally Solo & Manroth, supra note 49.

2007

BANKING LAW REFORM AND USERS-CONSUMERS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

803

development is a good indicator of economic growth, capital accumulation and of
the technological change of the future economy."72 The study takes a specific look at
the financial situation in Bogota and what life is like outside the formal financial
system. For example, one family who moved to Bogota in the 1950s attempted to
build their home through self-help and ended up paying twice the cost of their
home.73

The study is harshly critical of the continuation of the government's tax on
financial transactions that was originally intended to be a temporary solution to the
banking crisis in Columbia. The tax has now been made a permanent one and has
been increased from 0.2% to 0.4%. Financial exclusion in the country has created
significant welfare losses, a declining savings rate, and a financial system that caters
to the wealthy through monthly fees that equal 5-10% of the minimum wage."
The study explains that an effective financial sector reduces the cost of
information sharing between economic agents and that the current trend does not
look positive for the country. Though the unbanked are often paid by check, they
have no access to financial institutions. As a result, they are forced to pay large
check cashing fees and do business in remote central bank locations. Further, to
obtain credit, every individual or small business must approach potential lenders one
by one to obtain the amount and terms that they require.
The costs of these factors inhibit growth in general. This has created an
alternative system whereby many individuals save and borrow primarily through
friends and family, and their primary savings is tied to home ownership. This
alternative method cuts off their financial resources from the nation or region and
hinders growth.
4. The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States. This study examines
how impoverished households in the United States and Mexico obtain basic financial
services. It also examines the efforts that the private sector and government have
taken to provide access to these services, both in terms of cost and quality. The
different ways in which the unbanked operate in the United States and Mexico
provides an instructive contrast, illustrating how policies can be effective and how
policies must differ based on cultural differences in saving and investing.
The differing private sector approaches by the U.S. and Mexico illustrate the
link between broader coverage of financial services and economic growth. The
savings and loan crisis experienced in the U.S. in the 1980s did not cause a major
sector collapse because U.S. banks had spread their business over a wider gamut and
depended on a variety of population sectors in addition to the wealthy. This can be
contrasted with the similar situations experienced in Mexico and Colombia that did
cause major financial crises.
Experience also shows that financial institutions catering to low-income clients
can be good businesses. Recent studies by the U.S. Federal Reserve have favorably
compared the profitability of investments under the Community Reinvestment Act
credits to commercial investments. These studies have also shown the profitability

72. Id. at 10 (citing Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,
35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997)).
73. Id. at 7.

74. Dr. Mauricio Herra-Baquero, financial and economic development law expert, of the Externado
University Law faculty in Bogota has advised the authors of these subsequent events.
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of community development financing institutions as favorable to other start-up
banks. 7
The differences between the unbanked in Mexico and the United States are
striking. One study showed that in the United States, where there are multiple
alternatives, check cashing services can often charge a fee of 2-3%. 71 In Mexico,
where there are few practical alternatives, there are no fees for check cashing
services. 7' This shows that significant differences exist and any approach to solving
issues must take into account those differences: there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
Consider the above studies; the challenges facing the impoverished in obtaining
financial assistance are at best difficult and at worst impossible. The collective
observations of these four studies reaffirms that although the poor face challenges,
there is much work that can be done to alleviate the severity of these cycles of
poverty. There are common policies that can be implemented across Latin America
which would go a long way to improving the situation the unbanked in those
countries face.
B.

FSAPs: One PossibleSupporting Pillarfor the "Next Generation"of Financial
Sector Legal reform.

Coming out of the 1998 Birmingham and 1999 Cologne G8 Summits, the IFIs
received mandates to both internally evaluate the effectiveness of their IFI reform
programs, and more broadly to develop assessment mechanisms concerning the
condition of the financial sector as a whole with recommendations for reform.
Underlying the policy is the thought that identification of financial system strengths
and vulnerabilities will help promote financial stability and reduce the potential for
crisis. These mandates have led to the enhancement of IMF surveillance
mechanisms, to the establishment of independent internal offices, and to the
establishment of a joint IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP), beginning with a joint pilot program in 1999.8 Based on the initial success
of the pilot program, the joint FSAP program was refined and formalized on an
ongoing basis, with this initiative being coordinated through an IMF-World Bank
Financial Sector Liaison Committee. 79 As conceived, the FSAP
... is widely recognized by participating countries and by the international
community as an important instrument for diagnosis of potential
vulnerabilities and analysis of development priorities in the financial
sectors of member countries ....
One objective of the FSAP is to help
countries map a transition to a more diversified and competitive financial
sector without creating vulnerabilities.
A well-functioning financial

75. See generally, William C. Apgar and Mark Deida, The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Community
Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishment and Future Regulatory Challenges, FED. RES. ECON. POL. REv.
169 (June 2003).
76. Caskey et al., supra note 50, at 8, 22.
77. Id. at 41.
78. See Staff of IMF and World Bank, Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)- A Review:
Lessons
from
the
Pilot
and
Issues
Going
Forward,
available
at
www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/2000/review.htm#tabl.
79. IMF & World Bank, FinancialSector Assessment Program-Review, Lessons, and Issues Going
Forward5 (Feb. 24, 2003), availableat http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/2003/review.pdf.
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services sector is essential for sustained economic development and
poverty reduction. The existence of a wide and diversified set of sound,
well-managed institutions and markets also reduces the likelihood and
magnitude of a financial crisis.
Thus, from its inauguration, in order to accommodate the differing institutional
missions of the IMF and the Bank, the FSAP initiative has been articulated in terms
of bifurcated objectives: (i) financial crisis prevention and financial stability and (ii)
economic development and poverty reduction.8 This author suggests that these
objectives are not necessarily coextensive nor fully compatible. Further, this author
would note that in terms of the Bank's mandate, these objectives gloss over what a
well-functioning financial services sector should mean in terms of economic
development and poverty reduction. Moreover, the causal linkage between the
modern financial sector model envisioned by the FSAP criteria and instruments and
actual poverty reduction has never been empirically substantiated. This being said
the Bank's stated FSAP objective might provide the context within which to
determine how best the FSAP process can be utilized as a catalytic and supportive
vehicle for the next generation of financial sector reform.
Functionally, FSAP is requested voluntarily by a country and is normally
effected over several joint IMF-Bank team missions. 2 Upon completion, the team
prepares an aide-memoir presenting the findings.83 This non-published, confidential
document will be used by the IMF to prepare a Financial Sector Stability
Assessment (FSSA) for presentation to its Executive Board, and is often used also in
connection with the Fund's surveillance role under its biennial Article IV
consultations. The Bank staff will use the aide-memoir to put together a Financial
Sector Assessment for its Executive Board5
The FSAP itself entails three main components: (i) systematic analysis of
financial soundness indicators (FSIs) and stress tests; (ii) assessments of standards
and codes; and (iii) assessment of the broader financial stability framework,
including systemic liquidity arrangements, governance and transparency, and
financial safety nets and insolvency regimesYi The FSAP work has come to support
the IMF's role in the standards and code area and to support the Bank's
development efforts (particularly as to technical assistance), including its Country
Assistance Strategies.
The FSAP is separate from, but substantively linked to, the IMF's role as to the
Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes initiative (ROSC initiative).
According to the Bank, there are three reasons for its participation in the ROSC
initiative:

80.
ld. at 4, para 1.
81. G7 Finance Ministers, supra note 18.
82. Id. at 25.
83. These are not published. Prior to March 2003, FSAP teams prepared more lengthy FSAP reports.
84. The author has been advised by a World Bank official experienced with FSAPs that this is the
procedure that has been internally developed.
85. On the nature and workings of the FSAPs, see generally World Bank/IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR
ASSESSMENT: A HANDBOOK (2005).
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- "[The] structural and institutional underpinnings of a market economy are an
important complement to sound macroeconomic policies for both successful
integration with the world economy and for sound development[;]"
"[Ijmplementation of standards can help countries establish these
foundations, in turn contributing to national and global financial stability[;]" and
- "[P]artnership with the IMF provides the basis for a comprehensive
approach
''
and broad-based effort on the implementation of standards."
However, the FSAP, at least for the Bank, utilizes particular codes and
standards selectively and more flexibly (in consultation with the host country), and
may deal with standards not formally under the ROSC (e.g., creditors rights and
corporate insolvency, deposit insurance and bank insolvency), and will deal with
cross-sectoral issues. In recent years, the Bank has been attempting to integrate the
FSAP, FSA, and ROSC processes into its evolving development agenda.m Notably,
this integration effort has begun to address the developmental context of the overall
financial legal infrastructures and issues of access.
The FSAP process for the Bank has its limitations in addressing the
developmental context and content of the "next generation" of financial sector legal
reform. The process is a joint institutional effort with divergent overall objectives. It
is conducted by a joint institution team and is a complex technical process.
However, the FSAP is also a flexible data gathering process that most probably can
be better and more broadly utilized by the Bank and its LVP in evaluating, revising,
and prioritizing its financial sector reform policy objectives and related technical
assistance. Certainly, this is well worth serious consideration by the Bank and its
LVP and the IMF.

IV. Two CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE:
MICROFINANCING AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION
In looking selectively at recent developments in the financial access area as to
developing countries, two potential institutional developments are worth noting for
present purposes: (i) the rise of microfinancing and (ii) private banking industry
initiatives in South Africa.
A.

Microfinancing

With the recent Nobel Peace Prize award to Muhammad Yunus of the Grameen
Bank in India for his and his bank's work with developing microfinance products for
the poor and expanding the use of such products on a commercially viable basis,9 it
seems microfinance is a new discovery. The reality, however, is that microfinancing
has been around at least since the 1950s, having a very spotty record of success until

86. IMF & World Bank, Assessing the Implementation of Standards:A Review of Experience and Next
Steps 26 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2001/eng/review.pdf.
87. Id. ch. 5.
88. Id. ch 4.
89. See
generally
NobelPrize.org,
The
Nobel
Prize
2006,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/2006.

2007

BANKING LAW REFORM AND USERS-CONSUMERS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

807

more recent times.90 The recently formed Consultative Group for Assisting the
Poorest, a consortium of donor countries affiliated with the World Bank, has
brought microfinancing into the mainstream of the IFI development agenda.
1.

Background

Microfinance, along with credit and national savings structures for small- and
medium-sized enterprises has come to be viewed as of major importance for
enhancing the social and economic impact of the financial sector of developing
countries.9 Microfinance today is seen as a vital tool against poverty since it directly
provides to low-income people the tools to build assets, increase and protect their
source of income, and reach self-sufficiency. For example, in Latin America (which
will be the geographic focus of Part IV(A)), microfinance institutions started being
established in the 1980s with the arrival of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
making loans to poor "microentrepreneurs."
In 1992, the Bolivian NGO,
PRODERM, was converted into the first regulated MFI in Latin AmericaBancoSol, a regulated commercial bank. 92
Today, it is probably safe to argue that Latin America has the longest tradition
of commercially viable microfinance. In fact, competition tends to be intense in
some countries, especially in urban areas, and interest rates in some countries have
declined dramatically as a result of that competition. For instance, in Bolivia,
market pioneer BancoSol charged a combination of interest and fees equivalent to a
sixty-five percent annual percentage rate when it began operating as a bank in 1992.
Today, BancoSol operates in a highly competitive environment and has brought its
interest rate down to twenty-two percent. " In addition, "leading institutions are
increasingly offering a variety of financial services to their clients, including savings
and management of international and domestic funds transfers.""
2.

Improvement of Microfinance

Despite some degree of market penetration to date and a variety of financial
services offered in some Latin American countries, there remains significant
opportunities in larger Latin American countries where little microfinancing is
currently occurring (e.g., Mexico and Brazil), in secondary cities and in rural areas.95
Despite media hype, only a small percentage of SMEs at the moment have access to

90.

For a discussion on microfinancing, see generally the CGAP's extensive website on the matter,

available at http://cgap.org/portal/site/cgap.
91.

See generally International Year of Microcredit, E.S.C. Res.1998/28, U.N. ESCOR, 45th mtg.,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/197 (Feb. 22, 1999).
92. On
BancoSol
generally,
including
its
history
and
development,
see
www.bancosol.combo/en/historia/htm.
In addition, on this site there is a separate link
"historiamicro.e.pdf" that contains a detailed discussion of the history of microfinance in Latin America.
Though some trace this development to the 1960s creation of ACCION International, then a student-run
NGO in the shantytowns of Caracas, Venezuela, the actual practical development really began in the
1980s.
93.

See bancosol.combo/en/historia.htm.

94.

BRIGIT HELMS, ACCESS FOR ALL: BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 9 (2006).

95.

Id.

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 42:789

formal financial services in Latin America.96 Even in Chile, which has one of the
most developed financial markets of the continent, only large and well-established
firms have access to the range of financial instruments available.97
The large number of excluded people in Latin America will gain access only if
financial services for low-income people are integrated into all three levels of the
financial system: micro (financial service providers), meso (support services and
infrastructure), and macro (legislation, regulation, and supervision).98 Therefore, it
will be necessary to coordinate public and private reforms in order to enhance the
equality and access to financial systems.
First, it is important to understand client demand and to translate this "into
high-quality, affordable, and convenient financial services offered by a range of
providers."99 Today, microfinance is about building sound domestic financial
intermediaries that can provide services to low-income clients on a permanent basis.
Sustainability ensures that low-income clients have permanent access to services."°
Second, to ensure sustainability, it is necessary to have a strong financial
infrastructure (the meso level), which includes a complex and varied set of
procedures and instruments "consist[ing] of systems that allow for electronic
payments and service providers, such as auditors, raters, consulting services,
information and point-of-sale technology vendors, specialized technical support, and
professional associations." ' '1 "Accurate, standardized, and comparable information
on financial performance is imperative for integrating microfinance into the financial
system."' '
Finally, the government (the macro level) needs to offer a policy
environment that allows competitive and diverse financial service providers to
flourish. The key actions for governments are maintaining macroeconomic stability,
avoiding interest rate caps, and refraining from distorting the market with
unsustainable, subsidized, and high-delinquency loan programs. Governments can
also adjust banking-sector regulation and supervision to facilitate microfinancing
while also protecting low-income people's deposits. "Governments can further
support financial services . . . by improving the legal framework for contract
enforcement and collateral rights, ensuring practically and legally feasible systems of
land titling, and ensuring that tax systems do not discriminate against different types
of institutions engaged in microfinance." 3

96. See Alvaro Ramfrez, The Microfinance Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean 5 (2004).
available
at
http://www.ruralfinance.org/servlet/BinaryDownloaderServlet?filename=1126101177627_Microfinance-ex
perience-inLAC.pdf.
97. See Sophie Sirtaine, Access to Finance by Chilean Corporations 3,89 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 3845, 2006), availableat http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3845.html.
98. See HELMS, supra note 94, at 13-14.
99. Id. at 140.
100. Id. at 56.
101. Id. at 140.
102. Id. at 73.
103. Id. at 92.
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The Regulatory Reform

"[T]he pressure for regulatory reform has been building on several fronts in
[Latin America] since 1995."" Such pressure has led some countries in the region to
create new types of financial institutions, precisely for the purpose of enabling
nonprofit foundations to transform into financial intermediaries. 9
Bolivia, for example, has a special law governing private financial funds or
Fondos Financieros Privados (FFPs) that permits NGOs to become specialized
financial institutions.'
As of April 2005, the minimum capital for these NGOs
required was only $1 million, while the minimum capital required for banks was $3
million. 7 Like banks, FFPs are subject to prudential supervision and are monitored
by the Banking Superintendency."'
"The Superintendency requires all deposittaking institutions (including FFPs) to submit their financial statements on a daily
basis, an administrative burden that may discourage FFPs from entering into more
remote rural areas with weak telecommunications infrastructure.' °9
There are two situations in which it may be appropriate to create a new
type of institution to facilitate the transformation of nonprofit microcredit
foundations into licensed and supervised financial intermediaries. First, if
the minimum capital requirement for existing institutional forms . . . is
very high it could prevent . I . mature and well-managed foundations from

entering the formal financial system. Second, if the existing institutional
form that has the lower minimum capital requirement . . . is severely

limited in the type of operations it can carry out-particularly in the area
of savings mobilization -then it may simply be an unattractive form of
institution for those microcredit foundations that want to enter the formal
financial system." °
In some Latin America countries, "[t]he bad reputation of finance companies
has sometimes been mentioned as a reason to create a new institutional form for
non-profit foundations that want to transform into formal financial
intermediaries.""'
Creating new institutions for microfinance, even when well-justified and
structured, is not enough to provide a regulatory framework for microfinance. The
first and perhaps most important step to this end is to design appropriate regulations
for microlending as such, in which the regulation "should be guided by three
principles: flexibility, simplicity, and automaticity-flexibility in interest rates,
collateral and internal credit processes; simplicity in client documentation, loan
delinquency and recuperation of collateral; and automaticity in portfolio

104. Tor Jansson, Microfinance Regulation Sweeping Latin America, MICROENTERPRISE DEV. REV.
(Inter-American
Development
Bank),
Aug.
2002,
at
4,
available
at
http://www.esglobal.com/pdf/PrivateCapitalforMicrofinanceHowtoTurn.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See HELMS, supra note 94, at 88, Box 5.6.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Jansson, supra note 104. at 6.
Ill. ld. at 6.
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classification, loan loss provisions and write-offs."". In conjunction, such "basic rules
provide room for innovation, lower the regulatory costs of compliance and subject
microlending to a strict recognition of revenues, expenses and risks.""' 3
Finally, although the regulatory framework is relevant, it constitutes only part
of the story. The remaining part is supervision. "Since most of the regulatory
initiatives are still quite recent (apart from Bolivia and Peru), supervisory authorities4
have not yet developed effective processes, tools and practices of supervision.""1
"Ineffective supervision may be worse than none at all, because poor (and other)
clients could be lulled into a false sense of security.""' 5 "Achieving the proper mix of
regulations and supervisory practices that foster competitive and sound
microfinance" is the key, 6and it "will require a sustained commitment on the part of
supervisory authorities.""
Developing countries that are pursuing reforms to improve microfinance need
to analyze all levels of the financial system, avoid distortion in other areas, and
maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole.
Importantly, the private sector should be brought to the table to participate in
the microfinance process, seeing such participation as a commercial opportunity, and
not as a money-loser or subsidized competition. The government, in turn, should
foster competition and facilitate chartering of financial institutions specialized in
lower-income segments of the population.
B.

An Example of Non-Regulatory Public-PrivateInitiative: The Case of South
Africa

South Africa, as a developing country, faces the general challenge of providing
basic financial services to the poor. Specifically, the country is searching for ways to
reduce the entrenched inequality of incomes, economic opportunities, and access to
services left over from years of apartheid. Ironically, apartheid did leave South
Africa with a developed banking system that served the dominating white
population."7 In the author's view, the "trick" is how to bring this banking sector
into the developmental agenda of the country. With over half of the South African
population living on $2 per day or less, it is imperative that the major financial
institutions help redress the historically weak system of services for lower-income
people.
Facing impending regulation (i.e., a community reinvestment-type of legislation
similar to that in the United States), the South African financial sector recently has
responded to this demand for the expansion of access to financial services to a
broader segment of the population in the form of the Financial Sector Charter (the
Charter). This negotiated document was adopted by the financial sector in October

112. Id. at 8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See HELMS, supra note 94, at 87.
116. See Jansson, supra note 104, at 8.
117. See generally Tito Mboweni, Governor, South African Reserve Bank, Address at the Year End
Media Cocktail Function, The South African Banking Sector: An Overview of the Past 10 Years 1 (Dec.
14, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r041231f.pdf.
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2003 and brought into effect on January 1, 2004."' The Charter represents an
important private sector response to the broader challenges of transformation
within, and transformation initiatives by, the financial sector.
1.

Background

As mentioned above, South Africa has a well-developed and highly
sophisticated formal banking system."9 At the end of 2004, there were thirty-eight
registered banks in South Africa.12 For historical reasons, a large proportion of the
South African population has not been adequately served by the formal banking
system.21 Mainly the poorest sectors of the population and rural areas have fallen
outside of the net of the services provided by the formal banking system.'22 Prior to
the adoption of the Charter, the major banks were pressured to extend financial
services-including credit for low-income housing to the poorest sectors of the South
African population-and to desist from discriminatory lending practices. However,
the government's response to the challenge of expanding access to financial services
and access to housing finance for low income households has, from an early stage,
been characterized by the search for constructive partnerships between the private
sector and the public sector. The state would take measures to encourage the
resumption of payments for goods and services, reinstating the rule of law, whereas
the private sector would support the government in its efforts to bring about
financial stability. In pursuing the goal of partnership with the private sector, it
would seem as though there has been an almost studious avoidance of prescription
to the private sector while at the same time maintaining subtle and overt pressure on
the private sector lending institutions to participate more meaningfully in the
transformation process. Two major legislative acts, the Home Loan and Mortgage
Disclosure Act 23 and the draft Community Reinvestment (Housing) Bill of 2002, 2''
were developed by the Government but never actually implemented. This failure to
implement legislation further reinforces the notion that the Government preferred
to operate within a collaborative, as opposed to a prescriptive, framework with the
financial sector.
2.

Responding to the Challenge: The Financial Sector Charter

The Charter identifies a number of challenges facing the Sector, primarily the
Sector's "inadequate" response to the increasing demand for access to financial

118.

The Financial

Sector

Charter, Jan.

1, 2004 (Financial

Sector Charter), available

at

http://www.treasury.gov.za/press/other/2003101701.pdf.

119. Gill Marcus, An Approach to the Consideration of Bank Merger Issues by Regulators: A South
African Case, 4 BIS PAPERS 133 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bispap04o.pdf.
120. Tito Mboweni, supra note 117.
121. Black Economic Empowerment Commission, BEECom Report 19 (2001), available at
http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2004/5/beecomreport.pdf.
122. Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 119.
123. Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act 63 of 2000.
124. Draft Community Reinvestment (Housing) Bill, 20002, Gazette 23423, Notice 747 (May 17,
2002).
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services.'2' The expansion of access to financial services is seen as "fundamental to
[Black Economic Empowerment] BEE and to the development of the economy as a
whole." '26 The broad commitment assumed in paragraph 8 of the Charter is to
"increase effective access to first-order
retail financial services to a greater segment
''
of the population, within LSM 1-5. 127
It is important to understand the two key concepts-"effective access" and
"first order financial resources"-used in the Charter. The concept of "effective
access" as utilized in the Charter has five dimensions: 1) Financial service
infrastructure must be located within 20 kilometers of potential users; 2) The range
of products must be sufficiently diverse; 3) The products must be offered nondiscriminatorily; 4) The products offered must be appropriate and affordably priced;
and 5) The products must be structured and described in an way that is easily
accessible.
"First-order retail financial services" as defined in the Charter include: 1)
Transaction products and services, which serve the function of day-to-day purposes;
2) Savings products and services, which serve the function of providing "a basic and
secure means of accumulating funds over time"; 3) Credit for low-income housing;, 2
and 4) Insurance 13products
and services, which provide a cushion against defined first
0
order basic risks.
These provisions, and indeed the Charter as a whole, effectively depict the
process of forming a constructive partnership between the Government and the
private sector to meet the challenges of transformation.
Additionally, the broad Charter commitment referred to above is made more
concrete by a set of specific undertakings which can broadly be divided into two
categories: those whose implementation is sector-centric in that the responsibility for
their implementation rests solely with the Sector ("sector-centric undertakings"),
and those whose implementation depends on negotiated arrangements reached with
the Government and other actors ("collaborative undertaking"). Furthermore, the
Charter parties undertake to establish, in collaboration with the Government, a
monitoring and review mechanism "for the ongoing evaluation and review of the
impact of [the financial sector's initiatives] on access.'' 3 This strengthens the notion
of a partnership between the sector and the Government.
3.

Implementation Mechanisms

An independent council with a broad mandate to oversee the implementation
of the Charter is to be established.'32 The Charter Council is required to undertake
125. See Financial Sector Charter, supra note 118.
126. Id. para. 8.1.
127. Id. para. 8.3. LSM 1-5 refers to the Living Standards Measure designed by the South African
Advertising Research Foundation; see generally http://www.saarf.co.za.
128. See The Financial Sector Charter, supra note 118, para. 2.22.
129. It should be noted that low-income housing in the context of first order financial services is
aimed at households with a stable income of at least R$500 per month but below R$7500 per month. Id.
paras. 2.27.3, 2.34.3.
130. See id. para. 2.27 (examples of the first order risks mentioned are death and associated funeral
costs, household insurance, and health insurance).
131. Id. para. 8.6.
132. Id. para. 15.1.1.

2007

BANKING LAW REFORM AND USERS-CONSUMERS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

813

periodic reviews of the implementation of the Charter and is empowered to make
decisions regarding the implementation of the Charter in its second term (20092014).' 33 The Charter Council is to be comprised of industry association
representatives and other interested parties.14 Government representatives and
other interest groups are among the "other" interest groups to be represented on the
Charter Council. The Charter Council is specifically required to "fairly reflect the
interests of all the financial institutions," suggesting that there was a concern that the
independent body might undermine such interests. 9
The decision-making mechanism in the Charter Council is consensus. This may
be a mechanism for ensuring that the interests of financial institutions are not
undermined in the Charter Council. It seems however that consensus is the primary,
but not exclusive, mode of decision making within the Charter Council. An absolute
consensus requirement would imply the possibility of institutional paralysis in
circumstances where the Charter Council fails to reach consensus, especially on
matters of importance. The Charter states that a dispute breaking mechanism will
be agreed upon within the Charter Council, including the possibility of arbitration or
mediation.136 This suggests that it might be possible to have definitive outcomes on
contentious issues arising out of the deliberations of the Charter Council, lessening
the institutional implications of the consensus requirement.
The Charter requires each financial institution to report its progress in
implementing the provisions to the Charter Council on an annual basis.'37 Financial
institutions are required to publish an annual report for general information.'38 This
annual report is to include an audited scorecard and an account of the progress that
the institution has made in discharging the unquantified responsibilities set out in the
Charter. 9
Although the Charter is non-binding in a hard, formal sense as it sets
aspirational goals and standards of conduct, this does not undermine its importance.
The primary value of the Charter lies in the voluntary assumption, by private parties,
of part of the responsibility for making transformation work within a framework of
collaboration and partnership with the public sector. The Charter parties have
already begun to implement some of the provisions of the Charter relating to the
expansion of financial services to low and moderate income households. In recent
times some of the major banks have begun to open operating units in townships and
remote rural areas.' 0 An important development in this regard was the creation and

133. See id. paras. 15.1.1.,4.3.
134. The industry associations that were involved in the formulation and adoption of the Charter were
the Association of Black Securities and Investment Professionals (mandated by the Black Business
Council), Banking Council of South Africa, Association of Collective Investments, Bond Exchange of
South Africa, Foreign Bankers Association of South Africa, Institution of Retirement Funds, Life Offices'
Association of South Africa, South African Insurers Association, Investment Managers Association of
South Africa, JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, South African Reinsurance Offices' Association,
South African Insurers Association.
135. See The Financial Sector Charter, supra note 118, para. 15.1.1.
136.

Id.

137. Seeid. para. 15.2.1.
138. Id. para 15.2.2.
139. See id. para. 15.2.4.
140. John Reed, SA Takes Banks to the Townships: Banks are Responding to Laws at Correcting
South Africa's Racially Skewed FinancialSector, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004.
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launch, on October 25, 2004, of the Mzansi Account by the major banks together
with Postbank (a government institution).
The Mzansi Account is designed
specifically to meet the needs of previously ignored communities.'' The first set of
quantitative data on the Mzansi Account suggests that that it is a runaway success."'
According to the data, as of February 2005, over half a million Mzansi Accounts had
been opened.' Furthermore, an average of six thousand accounts was being opened
across the country each day.'"
In sum, the adoption of the Charter and the apparent impetus of the Sector to
collaborate with the Government in implementing the Charter's provisions vindicate
the Government's partnership-seeking approach in dealing with the banking sector
to achieve the extension of financial services and housing finance to low to moderate
income borrowers/depositors. The financial sector's initiatives in response to the
Charter have proven successful thus far and indicate a real potential for the
meaningful extension of financial services.

V.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: THE NEED FOR A SUITABLE
LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY
REORIENTATION

The world of the IFIs and Regional Financial Institutions (RFIs) has
historically been a world of economists, a large portion of whom are
macroeconomists, while law and lawyers traditionally have played a very minimal
role. But, during the 1990s, the IFIs/RFIs came to learn and appreciate the
importance of the legal-institutional infrastructure of a country in supporting the
domestic financial system by: 1) establishing the requisite institutional and
administrative capacities; 2) developing the desired supporting linkages between the
public and private sectors; 3) putting in place clear rights, responsibilities, and
liabilities of parties in a transaction; 4) maintaining the appropriate incentives and
adequate information that espouse market forces; and 5) providing adequate and
fair means to enforce legal obligations and claims effectively.
This author recognizes that for over a decade, institutions such as the World
Bank and the IMF have expended considerable efforts on "deepening" financial
sector legal-institutional infrastructure reform in developing countries (e.g., as to the
legal aspects focusing on the importance of property and contract rights and
remedies, secured transactions, corporate governance, and corporate and bank
insolvency;... and as to the institutional aspects focusing on modern administrative,
enforcement, and judicial bodies146). Such legal-institutional and infrastructural

141. Media Release, The Banking Council of S. Afr., Mzansi will Put Full Service Banking within
15KM of the Vast Majority of South Africans (Oct. 15, 2004), availableat http://www.banking.org.za.
142. Media Release, The Banking Council of S. Afr., The First Set of Data Shows Mzansi Hit the Spot
(Feb.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.banking.org.za/documents/2005/FEBRUARY/MzansiData_090205.asp.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See, e .g., World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and CreditorRights
Systems (April 2001), availableat http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/Insolvency Principles and Guidelines April
2001.pdf
146. In the latter part of the 1990s and currently, the World Bank has been most active in the area of
judicial reform.
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reforms are indeed a prerequisite to a sound foundation for building a viable
financial sector. However, these reforms fail to consider what a country wishes its
financial system to embrace, the base of participants to include, or what policies,
institutions, and additional legal infrastructure to implement in order to achieve
these developmental objectives.
For the legal system to achieve these objectives, key legislation needs to be put
into place, i.e., at a minimum, modern contract, corporate, bankruptcy, private
property, and commercial laws, as well as modern banking and investment securities
laws (and even, most probably, a basic asset securitization law). These latter legal
provisions specifically governing financial activities need to be rule-based and
transparent while preserving a required degree of flexibility necessary to adapt to
innovations and changing market conditions. The financial legislation/regulations
should promulgate disclosure of information so as to enable market forces to
discipline the activities of financial institutions and "market players." Clarity of
entry and exit standards of financial institutions reduces uncertainty within the
financial markets. A well-defined exit policy is especially imperative since this is the
time when the market is likely to act rashly and to cause self-fulfilling bank runs."'
In addition, administrative and judicial procedures need to be sufficiently clear
and to be backed up with quality enforcement entailed to them. The problem for
many emerging economies is the lack of any effective administration and
Thus, ensuring that enforcement is carried out extends the
enforcement.
appropriate incentives for market participants to act normatively. Two specific
priorities are seen as improving the enforcement of financial contracts: 1) Effective
means to take possession of collateral exist; and 2) Revision and updating of legal
codes are carried out to reflect new market realities.
The lack of legal remedies in the case of non-compliance can paralyze the
The
market and discourage foreigners from investing in emerging markets.
inhibits
also
and
processes
procedures
of
legal
outcome
uncertainty surrounding the
148
the robustness of financial markets.
Other key components for building modern international financial best
practices/standards might include the twelve key standards set out by the Financial
Stability Forum. '41 9 All these reform components serve to strengthen and deepen the
stability base of the preexisting financial sector, which is only representative of the
top of the socioeconomic pyramid. However, they are not designed to broaden the
financial sector base.
As mentioned above, the G7/8 views the "robustness" of a financial system is
an essential characteristic of a stable system. To promote this, the G10 Working
Group has identified three crucial actions that should be taken by each country
according to their specific situation:

147. See Ernesto Aguirre, The World Bank-Bank Insolvency Regim and the Global Bank Insolvency
at
available
principles),
insolvency
bank
(discussing
(2003)
Initiative
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/83870/aguirre.pdf.
148. Cf., John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper No. 26, 2002); Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing
Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAw. 875 (1999).
149. See NORTON, supra note 11, ch. 2; but cf., FSF, Compendium of Standards, available at
http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/about.html.
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[1)] Creation of an institutional setting and financial infrastructure
necessary for a sound credit culture and effective market functioning[;]...
[2)] Promotion of the functioning of markets so that owners, directors,
investors and other actual and potential stakeholders exercise adequate
discipline over financial institutions[; and] . . . [3)] Creation of regulatory
and supervisory arrangements that complement and support the operation
of market discipline.'
This would entail improving the infrastructural aspects of the financial system,
namely, the legal and judicial framework, accounting and disclosure standards, and
market structure. When viewed in this way, financial legal sector reform becomes a
deep, complex, and long-term matrix of reform efforts, presenting truly awesome
challenges for, and demands on, the IFI resources and personnel at a time when they
are being pressured to react to ongoing, immediate financial crises."' Yet, the
deepness of this reform process is not directed toward broadening the reform base to
be more inclusive as to access or as to serving true developmental objectives.
What is rightly asserted by Claessens and Perotti now seems self-evident for
those who have been involved with financial sector reform: the relationships
between inequality and finance seem to be becoming clearer at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Important research conducted so far has suggested that to
reduce inequality, financial systems need to be broadened, not just deepened.
"Financial reform will only reduce inequality . . . if it improves access to growth
opportunities for more individuals. Reforms thus need to broaden, not just deepen
financial systems."'' 2 Certainly, in logically and pragmatically following through on
Sen's paradigm of "choice (freedom) and development," choice presupposes
meaningful and effective "access.'. 53 Access, in turn, presupposes the existence of
suitable supporting governmental policies and financial sector infrastructure, which
presumes the presence of appropriate, supporting policies, institutions, legal
infrastructure, and legal instruments.
However, the need to broaden is not simply about creating greater access to the
financial system for the currently disenfranchised population, but should also
address broadening the financial system itself so that it is not structurally geared only
to the elite economic, business, and social elements of a developing country's society.
The financial system should also be systemically structured in terms of suitable
development policy to provide appropriate institutions, laws, and instruments for
accommodating the poor, low-income, and other excluded elements of the country's
population. For instance, it becomes critical to identify the particular sectors of a
society that need priority development (e.g., agriculture, small business, housing,
social safety net components, etc.), to assess the extent the existing financial sector
and institutions might be better utilized in furthering such developmental objectives,
and to determine what new institutions, laws, regulations, and instruments might be
required. To achieve all this in a coherent, sequenced, and long-term sustainable

150. Working Party on Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, Financial Stability in
Emerging Economies, 3-4 (Apr. 1997).
151. See, e.g., early discussion of the problems in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds., 1996).
152. Stijn Claessens & Enrico Perotti, The Links Between Finance and Inequality: Channels and
Evidence 1 (World Bank, Background Paper for the 2006 World Development Report, 2005).
153. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (2000).
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manner is indeed an enormous challenge for any country and for the supporting
IFIs/RFIs. But, without having a financial system that is relevant to a country's
developmental stage and objectives, and designed to bring in and to serve the
excluded in meaningful ways, a country's financial system cannot effectively
contribute to optimum, meaningful, and sustainable socioeconomic development.
Nor can such a system provide a broad, stable platform for achieving stability with
robust and sustained growth in the financial sector.
As indicated in the first paragraph of this Article, this author originally had
intended to address in detail the types of protection banking and financial sector
users-consumers in developing countries might require, until it became apparent that
the more fundamental need was the creation of a suitable user-consumer base, which
is currently lacking in developing countries. Should there also be consumer
protection in the financial sector of developing economies? Certainly, the answer
must be yes. In creating greater access to the financial sector, consumer protection
should be achieved in an equitable manner, and part of this equity needs to be the
assurance that both new users-consumers and those not yet included are fairly
treated and protected from predatory, overreaching, and abusive practices (formal
and informal). The provision of such protection should not be viewed as an
afterthought or as a subsequent level of reform, but should be an integral and
contemporaneous part of the access-equity financial sector reform agenda.

